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Law School-Administered
Financial Aid:
The Good News and the Bad News
William C. Whitford
In 2015, the ABA Task Force on Financing Legal Education reported a
vast increase in law school-administered ﬁnancial aid over the previous ten
years. Financial aid administered by law schools was even the most rapidly
rising cost factor for law schools collectively.1 At ﬁrst glance this increase might
seem like some good news for persons sharing my values and worldview.
Historically ﬁnancial aid has been associated with helping the ﬁnancially
needy, encouraging them and members of underrepresented identities to
attend law school, and helping make it possible for students who want to
devote their careers to low-paying, public-interest-oriented work to achieve
their dreams. In fact, however, as the task force makes clear, almost all the
increased ﬁnancial aid is being awarded to applicants with high LSAT scores
and high undergraduate GPAs—what is called “merit” these days.2 Any
correlation between the beneﬁciaries of increased ﬁnancial aid and the kinds
of students who traditionally beneﬁted from law school-administered ﬁnancial
aid is purely coincidental.
The recent increases in law school-administered ﬁnancial aid have taken
place as law schools cope with their most turbulent decade in my lifetime.
They face decreasing applications and enrollments, rapidly rising tuition,
rapidly rising aggregate student debt levels at graduation, and intense
competition between comparable law schools for rankings by U.S. News & World
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1.

TASK FORCE ON FINANCING LEGAL EDUCATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT (2015),
at 37 (figure 11), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/2015_june_report_of_the_aba_
task_force_on_the_ﬁnancing_of_legal_education.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6JPZ-QJ9X] [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT]. The report divides the expenses
of running a law school into three primary categories: instructional salaries, administrative
salaries, and grants/scholarships. Only the latter category has grown per full-time equivalent
student throughout the period for which the task force had data (AY 2004-05 to AY 2012-13).
Id. at 36 (ﬁgures 10a and 10b). See infra note 14 and accompanying text.

2.

Id. at 28–30. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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Report.3 These developments account for the dramatic increase in law schooladministered ﬁnancial aid, as well as the decisions law schools make about
how to distribute that increased aid, as I will explain. I will conclude this essay
with some discussion of the possibilities of redirecting a substantial part of this
increased ﬁnancial aid, so that it might better fulﬁll the objectives traditionally
associated with law school-administered ﬁnancial aid.
In this essay I rely upon empirical evidence gathered by others—especially
the task force report4—and upon generally accepted assumptions about
developments in legal education, and their causes. I have paid particular
attention to Brian Tamanaha’s provocative 2012 book, Failing Law Schools,5
and the considerable literature it has spawned.6 A good deal of this literature
addresses Tamanaha’s concern that law schools toward the bottom of U.S.
News rankings charge students more aggregate tuition than those students can
expect as a return on their investment in the form of enhanced income after
graduation.7 This concern, though a real one, is not the subject of this essay.8
I focus instead on developments within roughly the top 100 law schools as
ranked by U.S. News.
What Has Happened in the Twenty-First Century
The ABA’s Task Force on Financing Legal Education (hereinafter ABA
Task Force 2) was formed at the recommendation of the ABA’s earlier Task
Force on the Future of Legal Education (hereinafter ABA Task Force 1).9 ABA
Task Force 1 documented increasing law school tuitions, the resultant increases
in graduating students’ debt loads, and the increasing practice of distributing
available ﬁnancial aid on the basis of “merit” rather than “need.”10 Concerned
3.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS (annual) contains a section devoted
to ranking American law schools. Partial information from this section of the latest year
is available online. Top Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. EDUC., https://www.usnews.
com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools (last visited Aug. 11, 2017).

4.

ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1.

5.

BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).

6.

The critique of Tamanaha of greatest relevance to this essay is Philip Schrag, Failing Law
Schools—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 387 (2013). See also Randall
Shephard, The Problem of Law School Discounting—How Do We Sustain Equal Opportunity in the
Profession?, 50 IND. L. REV. 1 (2016).

7.

E.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, It’s Not About Us: Beyond the Job Market Critique of U.S. Law Schools, 26
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2013).

8.

Much good and current information on this topic is reported in a wonderful website
maintained by Law School Transparency, a nonproﬁt organization. See LAW SCH.
TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).

9.

TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
30 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HQ9J-DUFW] [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 1 REPORT].

10.

Id. at 22–23.
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that these developments were unfair and inhibiting access to law schools, Task
Force 1 recommended formation of ABA Task Force 2 to consider possible
remedies, and the ABA quickly acted upon this recommendation.
ABA Task Force 2 proceeded to gather the most complete data on law school
ﬁnances, including law school-administered ﬁnancial aid, that has been made
public to date.11 Each law school has long been required to provide detailed
ﬁnancial data about its costs and expenses, including ﬁnancial aid, to the
ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (hereinafter “the
section”), the accrediting agency for legal education institutions. The section
treats reports to it by individual law schools as proprietary and conﬁdential.12
Because law schools compete for students and rankings, the schools do not
want their detailed data shared with rivals. ABA Task Force 2 was able to
get the section to make much of the reported data available to it, on the
understanding that the data would be used only to create tables and graphs
showing collective trends. ABA Task Force 2 did not break down its collective
data by tiers—that is, in which quartile or quintile a law school stood in the
U.S. News rankings.13 It is possible, perhaps likely, that law school ﬁnancial aid
policies vary by which tier in the rankings the school occupies, but it is not
possible to learn or validate that from the report.14 Nonetheless the ABA Task
Force 2 has provided the best data available on what is happening with tuition
levels, aggregate student indebtedness, and ﬁnancial aid in our law schools.
The ABA Task Force 2 data conﬁrm the widely held impressions that since
Academic Year (AY) 2009-2010, law school enrollments have been declining,
11.

Published elsewhere in this issue is an article reporting even more detailed information
about law school tuitions, but this information is based on modeling, as described in the
appendix to the article. Though the models seem reasonable, the information published
is not data as such, just good guesses based on reasonable models. Jerome M. Organ, Net
Tuition Trends by LSAT Category from 2010 to 2014 with Thoughts on Variable Return on Investment, 67 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 51 (Autumn 2017).

12.

The section requires that some of the information submitted be made publicly available,
annually, on law school websites, in what is called a Standard 509 Information Report. E.g.,
University of Wisconsin—2015 Standard 509 Information Report, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://law.wisc.
edu/prospective/admissions/documents/std509inforeport-162-2730-12-11-2015_11-26-01.pdf
(last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/L6ZK-NBX6] (for Wisconsin Law School). The
same information for all schools can be found at SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS
TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES,www.abareqireddisclosres.
org(last visited September 6, 2017) section. The 509 information report includes a good
deal of information about law school-administered ﬁnancial aid, including the percentage
of students receiving at least some aid, the percentage receiving full tuition or more, and the
percentage receiving at least ﬁfty percent to ninety-nine percent of tuition. But the required
509 disclosures do not report whether the aid is awarded on the basis of “merit” or “need,”
nor do they report the average student indebtedness at graduation. ABA TASK FORCE 2
REPORT, supra note 1 includes information about these latter matters, though not broken
down by individual school.

13.

Its tables and graphs do, however, distinguish between public and private schools.

14.

Organ’s article in this issue estimates, based on his modeling, considerable diﬀerences. See
Organ, supra note 11.
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while tuition levels and aggregate student indebtedness (of graduates) have
risen dramatically and steadily since AY 1999, and continue to do so. Annual
tuition has increased over a hundred percent between AY 1999-2000 and AY
2014-2015 for public law schools on an inﬂation-adjusted basis.15 Average
student indebtedness at graduation, on an inﬂation-adjusted basis, increased
about thirty-three percent for public law school students between AY 20042005 and AY 2012-2013.16
The ﬁnding with respect to law school-administered ﬁnancial aid, which
has stimulated this essay, is as follows: “[T]he greatest percentage increase (in
law school expenditures per student) came in grants/scholarships to use in
discounting tuition. Between AY 2004-05 and AY 2012-13, the average increase
for public law school grants/scholarships expenditures was 99%, while for
private law schools the average increase was 44%.”17
Increases in law school-administered ﬁnancial aid have not kept up with
increases in tuition when the entire period beginning in AY 1999 is considered,
but since AY 2009 they have come close. During this period what both task
forces call net tuition (tuition less grants/scholarships) has remained stable
for private schools, while for public schools in the post-AY 2009 period net
tuition has increased at less than half the rate of net tuition increases in the
preceding ten years.18
ABA Task Force 2 looked into how much of the increased ﬁnancial aid was
being awarded on the basis of “merit” as opposed to “need,” or what Task
Force 2 called “need plus.”19 The available data come from the information
that the section required law schools to report for a period of years that ended
in AY 2009-2010. The data are not very reliable because the section has never
15.

ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. The rate of increase in inﬂation-adjusted
private law tuition for the same period was considerably less but nonetheless substantial. Id.

16.

Id. at 8. The equivalent ﬁgure for private law schools is about twenty-ﬁve percent. Id. The
period measured for student indebtedness levels, as reported by the ABA Task Force 2,
is diﬀerent from the period used for tuition levels, presumably because of the data made
available to it.

17.

Id. at 9. See also id. at 34–37.

18.

Id. at 27–28. Organ estimates that net tuition has decreased between 2010 and 2014 for
middle tier schools (in U.S. News rankings), based on his modeling. Organ, supra note 11, at 56
(Figure 1).

19.

Throughout this essay I put the words “merit,” “need,” and “need plus” in quotation marks.
With respect to the latter two categories, that is because there is no consensus understanding
of what the measures of “need” should be in a ﬁnancial aid scheme that targets needy
students. With respect to “merit,” I am convinced that substantial consensus does exist
as concerns decisions about ﬁnancial aid—LSAT score and undergraduate GPA—but I use
quotation marks nonetheless to show that I dissent from the exclusive reliance on these
measures to deﬁne “merit.” Such a deﬁnition does not include reference to any graduate
school record or other post-undergrad work experience, for example, presumably because
the U.S. News rankings do not consider these factors in measuring “selectivity.” Stated
otherwise, for purposes for ﬁnancial aid an applicant with “merit” is one who will help the
school’s ranking by matriculating, and nothing else.
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provided clear guidelines to reporting schools for what should be considered a
“merit” or “need” award, so schools did not apply the same criteria. Nonetheless
the data suggested that nearly all the increase in ﬁnancial aid went to “merit”
or “needs plus” awards. Pure “need” awards remained largely stable during
this period, essentially at historic levels.20 Testimony received by the ABA Task
Force 2 from law school deans reinforced these conclusions. One dean spoke
of a “merit scholarship arms race.”21 The ABA Task Force 2 did not attempt to
assess what is meant by “merit” in its report, but anecdotal evidence convinces
me it refers almost exclusively to the LSAT and undergraduate GPA scores
that are relied on strongly by the U.S. News rankings to determine a school’s
“selectivity.”
Should Merit Aid Be Shifted to Need?
Quite a few people, including both task forces, have expressed distress
that the distribution of the vast increase in law school-administered ﬁnancial
aid has been almost exclusively to students selected for “merit.” The biggest
concern is for increased ﬁnancial aid funded by tuition increases. These tuition
increases are not paid by the “merit” awardees of ﬁnancial aid, who receive their
“merit”-based ﬁnancial aid as tuition discounts.22 And because these students
do not receive sizable tuition discounts, the tuition increases contribute, often
substantially, to their aggregate student indebtedness upon graduation. It is
presumed—reasonably, I think, but I have not seen an empirical study on this
point—that students with higher LSATs and undergraduate GPAs have better
prospects than their classmates for higher-paying employment opportunities
upon graduation. The net eﬀect is that lower-LSAT students are subsidizing
the legal education of higher-LSAT students, when the latter are more likely to
have the postgraduate income that will allow them to repay substantial student
indebtedness without undue hardship. In the words of Brian Tamanaha:23
“Law schools have in eﬀect constructed a reverse Robin Hood arrangement,
20.

ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 28–30. For a recently published study that
validates this ﬁnding, based on a student survey in which the students self-report whether
they received a “merit” scholarship, see LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT,
2016 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS: LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES: ENGINES OF INEQUITY
(2017), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/LSSSE-2016-Annual-Report.
pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/HZ8R-93P4] [hereinafter LAW SCHOOL
SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES].

21.

ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.

22.

The clear trend is for schools to grant some kind of tuition discount to an ever-increasing
percentage of students. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1 found that in AY 2013–2014
about sixty percent of law students received some kind of tuition discount. Id. at 9. In this
essay I assume that these discounts are distributed in a skewed fashion, with the highestLSAT students receiving the highest discounts and students at the LSAT median or below
receiving much more modest discounts. Organ makes a similar assumption in constructing
his models. Jerome M Organ, supra note 11.

23.

TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 99. If one assumes that there is a correlation between LSAT
score and the wealth of the applicant’s family of origin, as I think is likely, then Tamanaha’s
“reverse Robin Hood” characterization is even more appropriate.
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redistributing resources between students, making the (likely) poorer future
graduates help pick up the tab for the (likely) wealthier future graduates.”
When the resources for additional ﬁnancial aid are derived from tuition
increases, the normative argument for shifting increased aid to “need” rather
than “merit” is based on distributional fairness, dramatized by Tamanaha’s
“reverse Robin Hood” characterization. However, not all the increased
ﬁnancial aid comes from tuition increases, and in some schools none of the
increased aid funds are derived in that way.24 Even when the resources for
increased aid come from sources other than tuition increases, strong arguments
exist for shifting increased ﬁnancial aid away from “merit” awards to entering
law students. I would redirect the awards to entering students with need and to
law graduates with low incomes through loan repayment assistance programs
(hereinafter LRAPs). My rationales are detailed in the following paragraphs.
Historically, when law school-administered ﬁnancial aid was commonly
distributed on a “need” basis, aid was thought to help students from families
who could not help them ﬁnancially to enroll in a law school. Today access
to legal education is facilitated by student loan programs, which will provide
students suﬃcient resources to cover tuition and reasonable living expenses
without working while in law school. Given the rapid tuition increases,
however, as well as the less-than-robust employment markets for recent law
graduates, there must be potential law students coming from families with
limited ﬁnancial resources who are deciding simply not to incur the heavy
indebtedness that a law school education would demand.25 Legal education
is the gateway to the legal profession. For persons who value class diversity
in the legal profession,26 as I do, there is still a strong case for distributing
ﬁnancial aid on a “need” basis in order to encourage matriculation. Few other
ways exist to enhance diversity in background within the legal profession.
I also argue for shifting ﬁnancial aid from “merit” awards to entering
students to LRAPs for law graduates needing assistance in repaying student
24.

At my former law school, Wisconsin, for example, all tuition goes into the campus’s general
fund. The law school receives an annual budget from the university administration, but
that budget is not directly dependent on tuition raised in any given year. Any relationship
between tuition raised and resources available to the law school, including those that could
be spent on ﬁnancial aid, is only long term, if there is one at all. So when Wisconsin directs
increased spending to ﬁnancial aid for “merit” students, in the immediate term it must ﬁnd
those funds from enhanced donor giving, from an enhanced stipend from the university
administration, or from cuts to other programs.

25.

I am not aware of good data showing reasons for the decline in law school applications over
the past ﬁve-plus years, but I assume that rising tuitions is one important factor, despite the
ready availability of federally guaranteed student loans to cover those tuition increases. For
a similar lament about the impact of rising tuitions coupled with tuition discounting for
“merit” students, see Shephard, supra note 6. Mr. Shephard, formerly Chief Justice of the
Indiana Supreme Court, was chair of ABA Task Force 1.

26.

I would also justify shifting aid from “merit” to “diversity,” whether or not the diversity
applicants have “need,” on similar grounds—that is, a commitment to improved demographics
in the legal profession of the future—but I haven’t developed that argument in this essay.
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loan indebtedness. Student loan indebtedness for law graduates has been
rising along with tuition levels, and the amounts have become staggering,
exceeding $100,000 for the median graduate.27 Professor Philip Schrag, in
several publications, has rightly emphasized that the potential hardships
facing these students has been signiﬁcantly reduced by federal government
subsidy programs developed for persons carrying more student loan
indebtedness than they can comfortably handle.28 Under the current incomebased repayment plans (called PAYE and REPAYE), most persons owing the
federal government can elect to set their student loan indebtedness payment at
ten percent of disposable income, even if that amount is less than the interest
accruing on the loan. If payments are maintained, any balance remaining
unpaid at the end of twenty-ﬁve years is forgiven.29 However, as Professor
Schrag has recognized, these generous repayment and forgiveness terms may
not be stable. Both the President, by executive order, and Congress can alter
or repeal these terms. President Trump proposed signiﬁcant changes in the
2018 budget which, if enacted, would negatively aﬀect law graduate student
27.

ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 32 (ﬁgure 9), reported an average aggregate
indebtedness in AY 2012-2013 of $127,000 for private schools and of $88,000 for public law
schools. The well-known Tax Prof blog reports average aggregate indebtedness for 2015
graduates of each of the top twenty-ﬁve law schools. The totals ranged from $144,000 to
$175,000, suggesting the amounts continue to rise. Paul Caron, 2017 U.S. News Law School
Rankings: Average Student Debt, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 18, 2016), http://taxprof.typepad.
com/taxprof_blog/2016/03/2017-us-news-law-school-rankingsaverage-student-debt.html
[https://perma.cc/ML6V-EFZX]. It must be remembered that these numbers are averages.
Many graduates have much higher debt loads. And these ﬁgures do not report all student
debt, excluding accrued interest at graduation as well as undergraduate indebtedness.

28.

E.g., Schrag, supra note 5. And Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre have rightly pointed
out that for most law graduates, the investment in legal education is likely to yield a positive
return over a lifetime, when compared with earnings likely obtained by persons not pursuing
education beyond a bachelor’s degree. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic
Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 284 (2014) (“For most law school graduates, the
beneﬁts of a law degree exceed its cost by a large margin.”). “[O]ur results suggest that
attending law school is generally a better ﬁnancial decision than terminating education with
a bachelor’s degree.” Id. at 285. See also Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, Populist Outrage,
Reckless Empirics: A Review of Failing Law Schools, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 176 (2014).

29.

Schrag, supra note 5, at 396–97. Discretionary income is deﬁned as adjusted gross income
(from tax returns) less 150% of the poverty level for a family of the graduate’s family size.
Any forgiven amounts are subject to tax at the time of forgiveness, which will be a sizable tax
jolt. Persons who hold public-interest jobs receive even more generous forgiveness terms. For
more information on repayment plans, see the Department of Education’s guidance, Work
with Your Loan Servicer to Choose a Federal Student Loan Repayment Plan That’s Best for You, FED. STUDENT
AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans (last visited Sept. 6, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/4TB3-R8GW], as well as guidance for law graduates speciﬁcally provided
by the AccessLex Institute: THE ROAD TO ZERO: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO STUDENT LOAN
REPAYMENT (Mar. 017), https://www.accesslex.org/sites/default/ﬁles/2017-03/29398_road_
to_zero_legal_ﬁnal3.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DVM-TR7P].
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loan indebtedness incurred in 2018 or later.30 While these budget proposals
still must make their way through Congress, where they may not be accepted,
in my judgment similar proposals will become increasingly probable as
the cost to the federal budget of promised loan forgiveness becomes more
immediate.31 It is well-established that aggregate student loan indebtedness
now exceeds aggregate credit card indebtedness, and most of it is owed to the
federal government and eligible for forgiveness.32
Little beyond anecdote has been published about the hardships imposed
on persons carrying large student indebtedness—for example, in securing a
mortgage loan to purchase a home—even assuming they have elected to repay
that indebtedness under the currently generous income-based repayment
plans. But it is hard to believe such hardships are not substantial for the
large number of law school graduates with aggregate indebtedness exceeding
$100,000, many with indebtedness well in excess of that amount.33 I believe
law schools should be concerned about the quality of life of their graduates.
Financial aid programs for matriculating students based on “need” can help
address the problem of law graduate overindebtedness, but I am suggesting
that LRAP programs, or what I like to call back-ended needs-based ﬁnancial
aid, are a more eﬃcient method to distribute ﬁnancial aid where it is most
needed. A student may graduate with very large accumulated indebtedness, but
if the student secures employment with a six-ﬁgure income, that indebtedness
is not likely to be a substantial hardship. It is students who decline and/or
are unable to obtain such employment who face the potential problems of
overindebtedness, and they are best identiﬁed by a back-ended ﬁnancial aid
program. LRAP programs can also facilitate greater law graduate choice
30.

The most signiﬁcant changes for law graduates would extend the minimum payment
period before eligibility for forgiveness for student loan “graduate” debt to thirty years,
and increase the minimum annual payments for low-income earners to 12.5% of disposable
income. The proposed budget would also eliminate the special ten-year forgiveness period
for graduates with public-interest employment. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump and
DeVos Plan to Reshape Higher Education Finance. Here’s What It Might Mean for You, WASH. POST
(May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/05/17/
trump-and-devos-plan-to-reshape-higher-education-ﬁnance-heres-what-it-might-mean-foryou/?utm_term=.1c0997295335 [https://perma.cc/DBC3-ECZK].

31.

ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 2, at 57–62 (Separate Statement of Professor Philip
Schrag, a member of Task Force 2). The forgiveness features apply only to persons who have
graduated after 2007, so with few exceptions the forgiveness “promises” have not yet aﬀected
federal revenues. There has been concern expressed in the media about the rising burden
on the federal budget from the forgiveness programs. See Jason Delisle, The Sprialing Costs of
a Student Loan Relief Program, POLITICO, July 21, 2017, https://www.politico.com/agenda/
story/2017/07/21/public-service-loan-forgiveness-cost-double-000478 (last visited Sept. 8,
2017) [https://perma.cc/Q6FQ-HDM3].

32.

See Sreekar Jasthi, Credit Card, Student Loans and Mortgage Debt in the U.S., NERDWALLET, https://
www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-card-data/credit-card-student-loans-mortgage-debtcomparison (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QMN6-D6FY].

33.

For recent accounts of the hardships imposed by student loans, see Editorial, Student Debt’s
Grip on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2017, at SR 10.
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in selecting jobs. Many graduates may prefer to pursue low-paying publicinterest jobs (e.g., civil legal aid), or to work in smaller communities where
legal needs are substantial but lawyer salaries lower, even when better-paying
opportunities are available.34 Count me among those who not only value law
graduate choice in selection of a job but also welcome choices that provide
legal services to sectors of the population whose legal needs are underserved.
The latter would seem a particularly appropriate emphasis for a public law
school, partially supported by tax revenues.
Not only do I personally favor a shift from “merit”- to “need”-based
ﬁnancial aid, including LRAP, but I think many law schools would implement
this shift if they were free of the pressures created by the U.S. News rankings.
As evidence of that conclusion, I oﬀer the ﬁnancial aid plans oﬀered by three
law schools that are largely free of those pressures—Harvard, Stanford, and
Yale. These schools do not have to compete for high-ranking students because
they are assured, by their reputations and previous rankings, of a student
body with high “selectivity” scores. They are also very well-endowed, receive
large donations from graduates as annual giving, and have lots of resources
to devote to ﬁnancial aid. I will brieﬂy describe Yale’s program as an example
of the kind of ﬁnancial aid program that I believe many law schools would,
and should, adopt if they were free of the pressures to increase the amount of
“merit”-based aid. Obviously most schools cannot aﬀord to be as generous as
Yale, but they could assign whatever resources are available for ﬁnancial aid in
the same categories as Yale.
Yale Law School distributes its ﬁnancial aid on a needs-only basis. Some
of the aid is given to current students as grants during their studies. The
balance is given to graduates through what Yale calls a Career Options
Assistance Program (COAP), basically an LRAP program. The student
grants are awarded after a complicated calculation that takes account of the
student’s savings, what parents can be expected to contribute if the student is
twenty-eight or younger, any spouse’s income, and what the student should
be expected to incur as loans. Parents and a spouse must submit ﬁnancial
information forms.35 The COAP program is very generous, much more
generous than the federal PAYE plan. Annual debt payments for graduates
of moderate income are lower under COAP, and COAP enables graduates to
34.

Both task forces addressed the unmet need for legal services, especially civil legal services,
by the economically less advantaged. Both explored the possibility of meeting some of those
needs by persons with less than a full legal education. See also Shephard, supra note 25, at
12–13.

35.

See How Need-Based Aid Works, YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/
cost-ﬁnancial-aid/how-need-based-aid-works (last visited Sept. 8, 2017[https://perma.
cc/65KK-LVEW].
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pay oﬀ their law school loans over a ten-year period, rather than over twenty
years under PAYE.36
Can Law Schools Shift from Merit- to Need-Based Financial Aid?
It has been frequently observed that competition for U.S. News rankings
has caused both the increase in law school-administered ﬁnancial aid and its
almost exclusive assignment to “merit”-based aid. Law schools are obviously
concerned that if they do not oﬀer ﬁnancial aid, usually in the form of tuition
discounts, to applicants with high LSATs and GPAs, their median scores on
those measures, so important to U.S. News’s selectivity score, will go down.
In regretting the almost exclusive assignment of additional ﬁnancial aid to
“merit” students, I am hardly the ﬁrst to assign deleterious consequences to
the competition for rankings.37 But it is important to stress this point. Student
selectivity is weighted substantially in U.S. News rankings.38 As importantly,
selectivity is a variable that schools believe they can control or manipulate
more easily than other variables weighted in the rankings. A school (other
than the very elite, like Yale) that signiﬁcantly shifted ﬁnancial aid from
“merit” to “need” could reasonably fear that fewer high-LSAT and/or highGPA students would matriculate, with a consequent lowering of the median
scores on those factors and a drop in the ratings. The extent of the drop is far
from clear—I know of no schools that have experimented—but this uncertainty
simply increases the risk adversity of schools to actions that can cause a drop
in the rankings. A drop in the ratings can have deleterious consequences to
a dean’s career, to the job prospects at top ﬁrms for the school’s graduates,
to the willingness of alumni to donate, and to the ability of faculty to place
publications in top law reviews.
An obvious solution to these diﬃculties is to get law schools to act in
concert. To gain control of ﬁnancial aid policy, law schools, or a signiﬁcant
group of them, might agree to implement a common ﬁnancial aid policy that
gave much greater emphasis to need, and then no single law school would lose
ground in the rankings competition for choosing such a course. Something
similar was proposed by Professor Deborah Merritt in a letter she sent to ABA
Task Force 1, suggesting an accreditation standard that required law schools
to award at least ﬁfty percent of available ﬁnancial aid funds on the basis of
36.

Students earning less than $50,000 annually are not expected to pay anything toward
loan repayment. Then the subsidies are scaled down as income rises. See Post Graduate Loan
Repayment: The Career Options Assistance Program (COAP), YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.
edu/admissions/cost-ﬁnancial-aid/post-graduate-loan-repayment (last visited Sept. 8, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/2AP5-33LC].

37.

E.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 71-103.

38.

Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2018 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS: EDUC.
(Mar. 31, 2017, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/
articles/law-schools-methodology (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5MWVXB2C]. Selectivity is weighted as twenty-ﬁve percent of a law school’s “score,” with median
LSAT and undergraduate GPA constituting most of the selectivity measure.
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need.39 But Task Force 1 agreed that such use of accreditation standards would
probably violate antitrust standards,40 as may any agreement or compact to
so act entered into by a sizable group of law schools. However, Deborah
Merritt and her husband have argued to the contrary in an article published
in this issue. 41 Some of the Merritts’ ideas require Justice Department or
Congressional action. The reader can decide how likely such action will be
during the Trump administration.
An alternative approach would be to persuade U.S. News to change its metrics
for the rankings. One obvious approach would be to give schools credit for
having a ﬁnancial aid program that emphasizes “need,” but this would require
some kind of reliable measure of what constitutes an award based on “need.”
That might be easier if only LRAP programs were considered for this credit.
U.S. News might also reduce the weight assigned to selectivity in its algorithm,
so that law schools that chose to reassign ﬁnancial aid from “merit” to “need”
would take less rankings risk. Another approach, which would still allow U.S.
News to include in its algorithm the current weight for “selectivity,” would be to
limit the LSAT and GPA scores used to calculate a median to those scores for
entering students who receive a tuition discount no greater than twenty-ﬁve
percent per year. The rationale for such a limitation would be that a student
who enrolls only because of a generous aid award, perhaps even a full tuition
discount, signals little about her/his evaluation of the school’s quality, and
hence his/her matriculation decision indicates little about the quality of the
school relative to competitors.42 If this last change were adopted, a school
would have an incentive to award its highest-LSAT and -GPA applicants only
a modest ﬁnancial incentive, perhaps reserving the funds saved for some kind
LRAP program. I think any of these kinds of change in the metrics used by U.S.
39.

Letter from Professor Deborah Merritt, The Ohio State Univ. Coll. of Law, to ABA Task
Force 1, May 11, 2013 [https://perma.cc/44UU-TF3L] [hereinafter Deborah Merritt Letter].
The letter is discussed in Shephard, supra note 25, at 10–11. See also Deborah Jones Merritt &
Andrew Lloyd Merritt, Agreements to Improve Student Aid: An Antitrust Perspective, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC.
17 (2017).

40.

The ABA is already under a consent decree that forbids it from adopting accreditation
standards that regulate the salaries paid to law school employees, including faculty. See
U.S. v. American Bar Association, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIVISION (last updated July 9,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-american-bar-association (ﬁnal judgment June
27, 1995). It would be consistent with this decree to forbid the use of accreditation standards
to limit competition among schools in attracting students through ﬁnancial aid policy.

41.

Deborah Merritt & Andrew Merritt, supra note 39, passim.

42.

I appreciate that many people believe that enrolling many high-LSAT students improves
the quality of a school, even if they do not pay any tuition. If U.S. News wanted to reﬂect that
value, it could base its selectivity score partly on median LSAT (and GPA) of all students
and partly the medians for students who, by paying at least seventy-ﬁve percent tuition, are
expressing an opinion about the quality of the school.
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News could be eﬀective in getting schools to alter their ﬁnancial aid policies.43
I am not experienced, in any way, in trying to persuade U.S. News to change its
metrics, and so have no basis for assessing the likelihood of persuading it.44
Finally, an individual law school could decide to do what I regard as the
right thing, accepting whatever consequences for its rankings that ensue.45
Were I still able to vote on a faculty, I would urge precisely that. And I am
pleased to be able to say that former Dean Frank Wu just shared similar views
in print:
Instead of identifying talented individuals who lack resources—the “strivers”
we claim to admire—we [law schools] are reinforcing economic hierarchy
[through our scholarship distribution policies]. We are sending the message
that those who already have so much, deserve so much more. We must do
better. The soul of legal education is at stake.46

I conclude this essay by highlighting two recommendations of ABA Task
Force 2 that are of relevance to this essay and can be achieved relatively easily.
First, ABA Task Force 2 recommends that the section resume collecting
information about the amount and percentage of law school-administered
ﬁnancial aid distributed on a “merit” and a “need” basis, and that the section
then make public the information for each school.47 Second, it recommends
that the section mandate that each law school provide more debt counseling
to its students and graduates than is now required by the U.S. Department
of Education.48 Both recommendations, if implemented, would be good
43.

One eﬀect would probably be to cause some schools to reduce their ﬁnancial aid budgets
and divert the funds to other purposes. Perhaps one eﬀect would be a reduction in that
part of tuition now used to fund ﬁnancial aid awards, which would not be all bad. It would
eﬀectively be a pro rata distribution of aid. Hopefully schools would divert more of their
ﬁnancial aid funds to LRAP programs, using the existence of a well-funded program as a
recruiting tool.

44.

A concerted eﬀort by law schools to get U.S. News to change its rankings metrics runs the
risk of constituting an antitrust violation. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. Cf. JTC
Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999). Individual law schools
not acting in concert could, however, contact Robert Morse, the chief data strategist for U.S.
News & World Report, who is in charge of developing the methodologies used by U.S. News in
compiling its various rankings of educational institutions.

45.

It might even be possible for a school to promote its needs-based ﬁnancial aid policy,
including an expansive LRAP system, as a way of attracting a niche group of students who,
despite lacking the highest LSAT scores, nonetheless will enrich the student body as well
as the profession later. In that way it could help build a student body with more “merit,”
though not as that term is deﬁned by U.S. News.

46.

LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES, supra note 20, at 6.

47.

ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 42. It would be helpful if the section would
also set standards for what qualiﬁes as “need”-based ﬁnancial aid. These standards should
be precise enough that observers can meaningfully compare one school’s policies and
performance with another’s.

48.

Id. at 41. The Department of Education’s current mandate is a prerequisite for the eligibility
for student loans for the students of each law school.
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developments, in my opinion. If law schools are going to continue to devote
nearly all aid to “merit,” because of rankings competition, they should at
least have to endure whatever public shame or guilty conscience results from
devoting little aid to students with “need.” And given the levels of debt held
by many law school graduates, surely as many debt-counseling opportunities
as possible should be made available to them. Within the very complicated
system for managing and paying student debt, a graduate can make many
choices, and the best option is often not obvious. I also note that both changes
are ones that schools could adopt without a requirement by the section, so law
faculty who share my opinion can urge such actions at their schools.

